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In our paper, we deal with the dynamic and consequences of the federal structure and 
the dual party system for the policy capacities of Flanders, one of the three regions in 
the  Belgian  federal  state.  Since  1993,  the  Belgian  constitution  officially  states  that 
Belgium is a federal state. The process of state reform began in 1970, after the birth of 
linguistic parties in the sixties. One of the main characteristics of the Belgian party 
system is the absence of Belgian political parties and the asymmetry of the regional 
party systems.  
The specific functioning of political parties in ‘Belgium’, in other words in its regions, 
has some important consequences for the scope for policymaking of those regions. The 
differences between the regional party systems are the product of the region-specific 
social and economical features. In spite of the unequal economic performance of the 
two main regions, the Flemish North and Walloon South, and the different economic 
challenges and possibilities, the Belgian federal level still retains several of the main 
economic competences and instruments. Therefore, the regionalised parties must, on the 
one hand, work together while in the cooperative federalism context, on the other hand, 
need to fight each other because of limited (federal) resources. We will consider the 
consequences of the elasticity and duality of the party system: does it enable or impede 
regional  policy  making,  in  particular  when  it  concerns  the  switch  of  the  unequal 
regional economies to a ‘new economy’?   - 3 - 
I. Introduction 
 
In some way, this paper deals with the complicated relationship between politics and 
economics. The central question concerns the implications of some of the main features 
of a party system for the management of economic policy. In this paper, we look into 
the effects of the party system in Belgium on the capabilities and difficulties of Flemish 
policymaking. In particular, we deal with the relevance of the Belgian party system to 
the opportunities and limits of the Flemish government to take up the challenges posed 
by, and to use the possibilities offered by the ‘new economy’. 
 
The influence of the economy on politics is no longer a matter of discussion but an 
established fact. On the contrary, all political scientists will acknowledge the fact that 
some of the main determinants of the political game have to do with the characteristics 
and performance of the economy. Not only the agenda of political issues (input) at 
stake, but also the resources available to state officials for answering (output) societal 
needs is a result of economic structure and performance. Furthermore, the positions and 
strength of several political actors, as well as their specific agenda and strategy are, 
among  others,  influenced  by  the  economic  situation  of  their  community.  So,  the 
relevance of economics for politics is beyond debate.  
 
On the other hand, the opposite direction of this fundamental interaction seems, now 
less  than  ever,  not  that  evident.  What  can  national  governments  do,  in  the  era  of 
globalisation,  to  manage  economic  processes?  Especially,  what  can  regional 
governments do? Since ‘Small states and word markets’ (Katzenstein, 1985) it is an 
established  wisdom  that  small  states  are  not  without  means  for  the  management  of 
global economic developments. This not implying that political authorities can control 
these  forces,  on  the  contrary.  Using  welfare  policies,  some  modest  channelling  of 
economic impact is possible, but more important, politics can make a difference when it 
comes to picking up opportunities, e.g. the Scandinavian countries, in particular the 
Nokia-case. Politicians can influence the economic performances or structure of their 
territory. Today, that influence –  which is softer than power – is less directive and 
demand based. In contrast to the fifties and sixties, in the age of globalisation political 
instruments  are  chiefly  directed  at  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  a  competitive 
climate  for  investment.  So,  even  in  2005,  political  actors  still  have  an  important   - 4 - 
influence on the economic performance of their political community. However, since 
this implies an extended reasoning that falls far beyond the scope of this contribution, 
we will not elaborate on this stimulating debate.  
 
Avoiding such  a theoretical contribution, we will add some modest elements to the 
general  discussion  on  the  possibilities  of  political  management  of  economic 
performance,  based  on  a  particular  case-study.  We  will  not  look  at  the  specific 
economic variables of the case under consideration, nor will we go into the specific 
contents of Flemish policy.  Instead, we deal with the (lack of) instruments Flemish 
policy makers have at their disposal and with how a particular political-institutional 
context could be used as an incentive for creative policy making and inventive policy 
learning. 
 
The context is the very complex institutional structure of Belgium. This paper is not 
about  Belgian  federalism,  nor  do  we  want  to  take  up  positions  pro  or  contra 
regionalisation or re-federalisation. In what follows, we overplay the economic aspects 
of this complex setting. Notwithstanding the fact that this paper is not intended as a 
theoretical contribution, our approach is rather abstract and general. That is due to the 
fact that, in this limited space, we cannot do justice to the subtlety and particularities of 
the  issue  at  stake.  The  main  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  question  a  popular 
representation. In Flanders, the current division of competences is often presented as a 
limit for economic development. In our paper, we indicate that precisely the specific 
division could also be seen as an opportunity structure, with the federal social and fiscal 
system as an incentive for creative policy making. 
 
In the next section we will deal with the party system. In section three, we consider the 
limits, in section four the opportunities of the Flemish policy towards the transformation 
into a ‘new economy’. What are the restrictions and possibilities that result from the 
particular  party  system?  In  section  five  we  conclude,  in  contrast  to  a  popular 
‘regionalisation thesis’, that a transfer of competences from the federal to the regional 
policy level – is not that indispensable in view of the ‘new economy’ policy.    - 5 - 
II. The Belgian (federal) party system 
 
In  Belgium,  a  bicultural  country  with  a  small  and  open  economy  and  an  extensive 
collective welfare system, public policy is complicated by its sui generis centrifugal 
federal  structure.  The  main  characteristics  of  its  federal  system  are:  (1)  the  lack  of 
Belgian political parties (in other words the absence of parties defending or representing 
the federal – Belgian – level). (2) The bipolar setting (Flemish speaking versus French 
speaking  communities,  no  third  party  available  for  changing  coalitions).  (3)  The 
absence of hierarchy (federal and regional laws are of equal value) between (4) mainly 
exclusive competences. Shared competences are exceptional. This does not imply that 
policy areas are clearly separated. For instance labour market policies: education and 
employment finding is a regional, unemployment acts are a federal competence.  
 
The Belgian political system is also defined as consociationalist and neo-corporatist 
system.  These  systems  of  conflict  management  caused  a  complex  arrangement  of 
negotiation arenas and collective bargaining. Belgium was a centralized state until 1970, 
but in several rounds of constitutional reform it has been transformed into a federation. 
Since the constitutional reforms of 1993, Belgium is a federal state with three Regions 
(Flanders,  Wallonia  and  Brussels-Capital)  and  three  (Flemish,  French  and  German) 
Communities.  Communities  are  cultural-  and  language-based  and  are  mainly 
responsible for education, cultural affairs and certain social services, etc. Regions are 
territorial-based and are mainly responsible for infrastructure, transportation, industrial 
policy,  certain  aspects  of  economic  policy  and  elements  of  labour  policy,  etc.  The 
federal or national competences are defence, justice, social security and the tax system, 
in particular those competences that relate to the maintenance of the Belgian economic 
and monetary union. The division of competences on the fiscal and financial level is 
complex. Regional fiscal competences are increasing – in Flanders from almost 750 
million  euros  in  1996  to  2890  million  euros  in  2004  (Budget  of  the  Flemish 
government)  but  are  still  considered  limited.  Financial  responsibilities  are  well 
established.  
 
Although there seems to be (two times) three components, Belgian federalism actually 
is bipolar, placing the Flemish speaking and French speaking groups against each other. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  Brussels-Capital  Region  is  mainly  French  speaking,  the   - 6 - 
relationship  between  the  Walloon  part  and  Brussels  is  neither  that  simple  nor 
harmonious.  The  real  dynamic  behind  the  state  reforms  and  still  one  of  the  central 
cleavages  in  Belgium  is  the  tension  between  the  Dutch  and  French  speaking 
community. Belgian federalism is asymmetrical: the institutions of the Flemish Region 
and Community have merged, in contrast to the French speaking institutions of Region 
and  Community  who  remain  separated,  partly  because  of  tensions  between 
Francophones  in  Brussels  and  Walloons.  In  other  words,  the  Flemish  government 
(parliament) is at the same time the government (parliament) of the Flemish Community 
and the Flemish Region. This means that all Flemish competences are concentrated in 
one executive and legislative.  
 
The Belgian federation is asymmetrical in another way: the unequal economic situation 
leading to, with some abstraction, a North (Flanders) - South (‘Wallonia’) division, is an 
important element in understanding Belgian politics. This is referred to as the so-called, 
and  somewhat  exaggerated,  two-speed  model:  a  high-speed  Flanders  (less 
unemployment, more economic growth and investment, sound budget) and a low-speed 
Walloon economy.  
 
The Walloon part still has to face up more problems of restructuring its old branches of 
traditional industry (e.g. steal). The Walloon governments have done relatively less well 
then the Flemish part in setting up high-tech sectors. (Witte, 1992:109-110) This is the 
result of the economic history of Wallonia, to which we will turn later, but it also has to 
do with political factors, such as the great amount of social security beneficiaries who 
predominantly support parties defending these social benefits. The success of the Parti 
Socialiste is amongst others based on their policy to avoid drastic social security reform. 
Anyway, the economic performances of the Walloon part are still less than those of the 
Flemish economy, and that since the 1960s when the Flemish GDP/capita exceeded, for 
the first time, that of the Walloon region. This is one of the classic arguments in the plea 
for more regional autonomy as it is defended by all Flemish politicians. Flemish parties 
demand more regional autonomy in order to cope with different and diverging regional 
social en economical conditions.  
 
Let’s have a look at the particular aspects of the party system. As we already mentioned, 
there are no national Belgian political parties nor a Belgian party system. Generally   - 7 - 
speaking, one can say that each political ideology consists of a Flemish and a Walloon 
branch and that there is a double party-system. We will now have a brief look at the 
history  of  the  party  system  and  on  the  consequences  of  this  particular  situation  for 
policy-making and decision-making. 
 
Until the sixties, the Belgian party system can be categorised as what is called a ‘two-
and-a-half-party system’: a (unitary) large christian-democratic and (unitary) socialist 
party and a smaller (unitary) liberal party. A first big change occurred with the elections 
of 1965. The liberal party progressed while the other two traditional parties declined. 
More  important  was  the  breakthrough  of  the  regionalist  parties.  In  Flanders  the 
‘Volksunie’  doubled  its  score.  Also  the  FDF  in  Brussels  and  the  ‘Rassemblement 
Wallon’ in the Walloon part obtained a very good electoral result and challenged the 
power position of the traditional, established parties. Several reasons can be found for 
the sudden success of these regionalist parties. According to Deschouwer (1996), an 
important element is the consociational system itself. This is “a very closed system, 
with a small cartel of elites arranging things the way they want. It locks out those who 
at a certain moment would like more and better participation.” (Deschouwer 1996, 298) 
Therefore  these  new  parties  will  react  strongly  to  the  traditional  parties.  A  second 
reason  is  the  nature  of  the  traditional  parties.  “They  lack  the  flexibility  to  adapt 
themselves  easily  to  new  challenges,  or  to  incorporate  new  questions  and  new 
movements. These have then to go and create new movements and parties outside the 
existing ones.” (Deschouwer 1996, 298)  
 
The new challenge would then be the demand for more regional autonomy. We should 
ask ourselves why regional autonomy had suddenly become a political theme. This has 
much to do with the changing economic situation in Belgium. From 1960 onwards, the 
economic centre of Belgium shifted from the Walloon parts towards Flanders (Gaus 
2001, 60). In 1967 for instance, the economic growth in Flanders was twice as high as 
in  the  Walloon  part.  The  main  raison  for  this  big  shift  was  the  unequal  economic 
situation in both parts of the country. The old industries (coal, steel, etc) were mainly 
concentrated  in  Wallonia.  Just  like  in  the  other  European  countries,  these  flagging 
branches  of  industry  were  struggling  to  survive.  The  decline  of  the  steel  and  coal 
industry provoked structural unemployment in Wallonia. In Flanders on the other hand, 
the automobile and chemical industries flourished. Multinationals invested particularly   - 8 - 
in  Flanders,  for  instance  near  the  port  of  Antwerp,  where  the  demographic  and 
environmental conditions were more favourable than in Wallonia. 
 
Next to the unequal economic situation, the politicians in both language groups held 
different views on the economic policy they wanted to pursue. The Walloon part opted 
for subsidization of the old industry and called for more government intervention. In 
order to do so, they needed regional competences in order to pursue such a demand-
based policy in the Walloon region. Flemish politicians were relatively more oriented 
towards  ‘new  economy’  approaches.  This  could  suggest  a  clear-cut  division  and 
diametrically  opposite  visions.  Reality,  of  course,  is  more  subtle  and  nuanced.  The 
different positions are a matter of relative importance, not absolute matters. Neither 
Flanders nor Wallonia is a monolithic bloc lacking internal differences. 
 
Both economic situation and different policy views strengthened the call for regional 
autonomy, so that each region could pursue policies according to their own vision and 
adjusted to the regional social and economical characteristics. The Walloons pleaded for 
economic regionalisation so they would be able to save the old industries and uphold 
public investments. Since many Flemings thought that regional decentralization would 
establish more cultural autonomy – the most important Flemish demand – both groups, 
although they had opposite demands, became allies. (Mommen, 1994) 
 
Traditional parties could no longer neglect the regional parties and their call for more 
regional autonomy, nor the unequal economic situation. So, they tried to incorporate 
this into their party program. Since they had opposite views on the economic policy, it 
was almost impossible to reach a compromise between the Flemish and Walloon faction 
in the traditional parties. Finally this led towards the split of the three traditional parties 
in Belgium, the Christian-democrats in 1968, the liberals in 1971 and the socialists in 
1978. 
 
The break up of the Socialist Party in 1978 marked a new era in Belgian politics. The 
Belgian party system did no longer exist and was replaced by a double party system 
with two separate electoral arenas. From now on, each party only competed with the 
parties in its own language group. So, the Flemish parties did not longer compete with 
their French-speaking counterparts or had to give account to the Walloon voters.   - 9 - 
 
This new situation had an important impact on the policy formulation of the parties. 
“Once liberated from the electorally unprofitable politics of compromise within their 
former national parties, the linguistically homogeneous wings of the traditional parties 
gradually took up most of the regionalist parties’ issues. Each regional branch rapidly 
moved towards the extreme position on the linguistic-regional division, leaving a large 
vacuum in the centre.” (Dewinter 1999, 198) 
 
This  view  is  also  shared  by  Pieter  van  Houten  (2000),  who  argues  that  a  focus  on 
electoral incentives and regional party competition can not only explain the variation in 
regional assertiveness as such, but also the variation in the particular nature of demands. 
He concludes that when there is a dominant regional party that competes with national 
parties, there is an incentive to only demand more control over how to spend revenues 
obtained  from  the  centre.  By  contrast,  when  there  are  several  regionally  organized 
parties and no strong national parties in a region, more radical demands for tax powers 
are more likely. Since in Belgium there are no national parties, Flanders serves as an 
illustration of strong regional assertiveness. 
 
Besides the fact the Belgian party system was split into two systems, we should be 
aware  that  both  systems  have  different  characteristics.  In  Flanders,  the  Christian-
democrats  are  the  strongest  party  whereas  the  Socialists  are  the  largest  party  in 
Wallonia. Hence, the Flemish party system is more oriented towards the centre while 
the Walloon party system is more left-wing. Although several reasons can be found for 
these differences, once again the unequal economic situation in both regions plays an 
important role. 
 
In theory, the divided party systems should not be a problem, if the parties did not have 
to cooperate in the government. However the federal governmental level is the place 
where the parties from both language groups meet each other. The absence of federal 
parties is one of the most important features of the Belgian federal party system. In the 
electoral  arena,  parties  are  self  centred,  only  concerned  with  regional  interests. 
Consequently this leads to a very centrifugal pattern of party competition: all parties 
plead for greater regional autonomy, while there is no party left to defend the opposite. 
However, Walloon parties fearing that the federal level will be cut down to the bone and   - 10 - 
will be dismantled defend a stop in regionalisation. According to Flemish politicians, 
this is not a matter of ideology or principle, but mere self-interest since the Walloon part 
needs the federal financial transfers in order to finance Walloon policy and benefits in 
the Walloon part. In the federal governmental arena, parties have to cooperate and find 
compromising solutions for both language  groups. Hence, the  Flemish and Walloon 
parties, especially the governmental ones, are in a schizophrenic situation: at the one 
hand, firm confrontational discourse towards one another in the own electoral region, at 
the other hand, at the federal level they have to collaborate with each other in order to 
form a Belgian government. This combination of firm confrontation and unavoidable 
collaboration  is  the  dynamic  of  the  complex  Belgian  politics.  For  each  important 
decision on the federal level, for instance on social security matters or justice affairs, 
both  language  groups  have  to  co-decide,  because  in  the  federal  government  both 
language groups are veto players. So, every decision, including further federalisation 
can only be the result of a compromise between the two groups. 
 
In other words, Belgium federalism is not only bipolar but also cooperative. As a result 
of a complex system of decision making, both partners of this Living Apart Together 
relation have veto instruments on the federal level. The Belgian art of compromise and 
ongoing  dynamic  of  give-and-take  does  not  only  generate,  but  also  resolves  ethnic 
conflicts in a peaceful way. 
 
One can say that politics and institutions do matter. Political differences are not only the 
result of different economic features, political decisions can alter some elements of the 
economic system. This dynamic can certainly be found in the Belgian federal party 
system. On the one hand, the double party system and the federal state is a result of the 
unequal economic situation. On the other hand, the different policy views and particular 
organisation  of  the  federal  state,  influenced  the  economic  environment.  We  will 
elaborate on this when we consider the limits and opportunities of the federal system.   - 11 - 
III. Limits to Flemish policymaking 
 
According  to  a  recurrent  ‘complaint’  in  Flanders,  this  region  lacks  several  relevant 
competences  now  locked  at  the  federal  level.  Since  Flemish  actors  cannot  always 
convince their Francophone partners at the federal level of a more ‘market oriented’ 
approach, economic arguments strengthen the traditional devolution arguments first put 
into words by the cultural Flemish movement in the 19
th century. The disagreements at 
the federal level between the Flemish and Francophone parties, in almost all policy 
fields, are numerous. A popular catchword, symbolising the conventional thinking, in 
Flanders is ‘what we do ourselves, we do better’. Since no federal agreement is fully 
compatible with the point of view of the Flemish partners and since this divergence is 
the result of the Walloon politicians, the mechanism of ‘jumping of scales’ is a popular 
instrument  of  conflict  settlement.  If  Flemish  politicians  are  dissatisfied  with  federal 
measures, they can always suggest the jumping of the ‘federal’ competence towards the 
regional  level.  This  is  a  never  ending  story  and  since  regional  politicians  strive  for 
‘homogenous  competences’,  the  federal  competences  deemed  suitable  for 
regionalisation are endless.  
 
This also relates to the economic policy, in particular to the strategies and instruments 
that should enable the regional economies to remain or become attractive in the global 
economy. However, since even in the political debate objective, neutral arguments are 
more convincing than emotional pleas for the splitting of the federal social security, the 
advocates  of  regionalisation  referred  to  the  literature  of  ‘fiscal  federalism’  and 
subsidiarity  (Deschouwer,  2002:55).  This  literature  essentially  indicates  that  the 
appropriate  location  of  competences  should  reflect  the  balance  between  costs  and 
benefits of (de)centralization. Subsidiarity is here a popular topic. Subsidiarity is not a 
blanket recommendation to decentralize, but is usually understood as a presumption that 
operates unless a clear case can be made for centralisation. Subsidiarity is not the same 
as decentralization, in essence it is a principle for allocating power upward as well as 
downwards, but it incorporates a presumption in favour of decentralisation, especially in 
case of doubt. (CEPR 1993)  
 
In Belgium, the ethno-linguistic conflict is primarily about the appropriate balance of 
power between the  federation and the states (regions/communities). Since 1970, the   - 12 - 
management  of  this  conflict  led  to  federalism.  Since  there  was  no  one  defending, 
convincingly the centre, the arguments of fiscal federalism are popular. Decentralised 
systems  are  deemed  more  effective  at  gathering  more  specific  information  and 
decentralised  governments  are  considered  more  responsive  to  the  interests  of  their 
citizens.  Both  elements  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  decentralised  governments  may 
provide a more credible way to differentiate policies according to the differing needs of 
local populations. It is not just a matter of efficiency in the allocation of resources, 
regional  governments  are  also  more  accountable,  and  should  therefore  pay  more 
attention to equity, or the fairness in distribution. According to the same argument, 
indeed, coordination is unavoidable, but it does not imply to centralise neither power 
nor competences. In a decentralised construction, with more competences to Flanders 
and Wallonia, both governments are in closer touch with the wishes, needs of their 
population and they are more flexible and responsive to local conditions. Therefore, and 
because of the dynamic of the party system, intellectual arguments in favour of more 
regional competences have tail wind.  
 
However, notwithstanding the fact that the Belgian regions are among the strongest in 
the  EU,  some  essential  competences  are  still  ‘locked’  or  ‘saved’  at  the  centre.  The 
Walloon  and  some  Flemish  parties  are  against  their  decentralisation.  One  of  their 
arguments is that this would lead to the end of Belgium, that solidarity should not be 
broken. Because of the unequal economic performance of both regions, a regional social 
security would probably be less extensive in the Walloon part than a federal one, which 
is  also  financed  by  the  more  prosperous  Flanders.  According  to  conventional 
interpretations of the literature on fiscal federalism, the federal labour policy and the 
federal fiscal and social security systems – symbolic and economic important federal 
core business – are to be regionalised. The Flemish parties are amongst the regional 
most assertive ones, so this claim is very loud and clear in Flanders.  
 
In  Flanders,  the  federal  level  is  often  seen  as  slackening  the  Flemish  economic 
development. Flemish politicians try to maximize their policy possibilities within the 
limits of the regional competences. This ‘stretching’ of the division of competences 
creates tension with Wallonia.  It is mostly linked with a  Flemish demand for more 
autonomy in labour policies and fiscal policies. But these demands are blocked at the 
federal  level  because  of  the  ‘joint  decision  trap’.  As  the  Walloons  see  the  macro-  - 13 - 
economic  tools  in  their  best  interest  at  the  federal  level,  the  transfer  of  federal 
competences to the regional level cannot be decided. It takes two to tango. Because of 
this powerful position of the Walloons in the federal institutions, it is not likely that the 
shared  pedestal  of  competences,  social  security  and  fiscal  competences,  will  be  cut 
down in favour of the regional governments. The fact that decisions cannot be taken 
without the agreement of both regions frustrates certain Flemish policy makers. They 
see the federal level as a millstone around the neck of Flanders. The one sided and 
antagonistic picture that some Flemish groups create is that of a fast running horse 
(Flanders) that has to pull a heavily loaded car (the Walloon part), and therefore goes 
too slow. But the car and the horse cannot be detached.  
 
One example is the reform of the system of sabbatical leave. That system was changed 
by the federal government. The Flemish government wanted to give an additional bonus 
to the employees who went on sabbatical. But the Walloon representatives did not want 
the other region to have a more attractive system. A similar example is the Flemish 
insurance for non-medical costs of senior citizens. It was the first time that a (small) 
part  of  the  social  security  system  was  installed  by  a  region  on  its  own.  Walloon 
representatives demanded that this particular insurance was organised on a federal level. 
Not  because  that  system  itself  was  not  good,  but  it  was  seen  as  a  first  step  in  the 
disintegration of the federal social security. 
 
Another illustration is the politically sensitive management of the federal railways. In 
the discussion for the new plan for the Belgian railways, new investments were asked 
around the port of Antwerp, in Flanders. This economic need was blocked because the 
division of investments was based on a political distribution code. This kind of political 
division of economic resources is one of the features of the Belgian balance between the 
regions.  This  so  called  ‘waffle  iron  politics’  was/is  the  use  of  compensating  every 
investment on one side of the regional border with an investment on the other side. For 
example:  a  bridge  was  built  in  Bruges,  as  compensation  a  part  of  the  highway  in 
Charleroi  was  renewed.  This  system  of  political  ‘peacekeeping’  led  inevitably  to 
economically inefficient investments. 
 
Inertia and the high costs of the federal policy are arguments used in the debates for 
more decentralization. But the argument that Flanders has not enough tools to build out   - 14 - 
a new economy policy is a political one. It is part of a never ending demand for more 
regional competences, as a result of regional competition between political parties and 
since no one defends the centre. But is it an economical necessity?   - 15 - 
IV. Opportunities to Flemish policymaking 
 
In the former section, we stated that the competences for Flemish policy making are not 
unlimited. Flanders cannot autonomously decide on its macro-economic policy or on 
social  security  issues.  However,  the  current  division  of  competences  can  also  be 
considered, not as a limit, but as an opportunity. Due to its limits, Flanders is urged to 
maximise its efficiency in the areas where it does have power. Let’s now have a look on 
this rather paradoxical statement. 
 
In several EU-member states, the (multi-level) classic Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) 
is disintegrating and is slowly and gradually being replaced by a (weak or stronger) 
version of the ‘competition state’, e.g. the Schumpeterian Workfare State (SWS). This 
version of the ‘competition state’ is a different kind of state than the KWS. The basis of 
the ‘competition state’ or the post-fordist SWS is flexibility
1: “rather than attempt to 
take  certain  economic  activities  out  of  the  market,  to  ‘decommodify’  them  as  the 
welfare  state  in  particular  was  organized  to  do,  the  competition  state  has  pursued 
increased marketization in order to make economic activities located within the national 
territory,  or  which  otherwise  contribute  to  national  wealth,  more  competitive  in 
international and transnational terms.” (Cerny 2000:122-123)  
 
The  ‘Schumpeterian’  element  refers  to  the  idea  that  political  authorities  should 
concentrate less on demand-side measures, such as full employment or a redistribution 
policy, should less try to preserve old industries but instead focus on the encouragement 
of promising activities, on the construction and management of a favourable investment 
climate (supporting ‘creative destruction’). In other words, political authorities should 
focus  more  on  a  supply-side  policy  (e.g.  education,  R&D,  infrastructure,  re-skilling 
processes, etc.) stimulating the international attractiveness of the local – especially the 
immobile  –  production  factors.  ‘Workfare’  –  the  ‘activation’  and  thus  heightened 
selectivity of social benefits – refers to the greater responsibility of the individual, both 
                                                           
1  Post-fordism  can  be  defined  as  a  flexible  production  system  based  on  flexible  machines  or  labour 
systems and an appropriate workforce. As a stable mode of macro-economic growth, post-fordism is 
based on the dominance of a flexible and permanently innovative economic accumulation. As a social 
mode of economic regulation, post-fordism involves supply-side innovation and flexibility in each of the 
main areas of regulation. The predominance of micro-electronics-based information and communication 
technologies, flexibility and permanent innovation are the solicitudes of the SWS. 
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for  its  own  success  or  failure  (e.g.  policies  encouraging,  in  several  ways,  the 
unemployed  to  make  great  efforts  and  to  take  initiatives  in  order  to  improve  their 
chances on the labour market). Workfare is based on a claim of reciprocity, on the view 
that social rights are conditional on labour obligations, since rights (to income) should 
be matched by duties (to labour or learn). Workfare – the ultimate policy of labour 
control – has been spreading in Europe, in part through the tightening of conditionality 
and the drift to means and poverty tests: “workfare represents a movement away from 
the insurance principle of social security without strengthening the right to work or 
income security. It is the outcome of the move away from universalism, and the drift to 
‘targeting’ and selectivity (…).” (Standing 1999:334) So, the post-fordist SWS stands 
for an important change of (regional) state responsibilities and for a different method of 
operation in order to achieve these central aims.  
 
In our view, due to the particular setting of a small and open economy, Flanders has few 
alternatives but to follow at least some way the track towards this post-fordist SWS. 
Bottom  line  of  this  economic  and  political  programme  is  the  advancement  and 
maintenance of an attractive climate for investment. Since regions are not able to pursue 
their own macro-economic or fiscal policy, they  have to concentrate on supply-side 
policies. The successive constitutional reforms gave the regions more competences in 
the field of education, R&D, etc. So, in order to increase productivity or attractiveness 
to foreign investments (globalisation), Flemish enterprises or politicians cannot simply 
choose ‘the easy way out’: lowering labour costs or taxes. In view of the high minimal 
social  standards,  including  highly  institutionalised  labour-capital  negotiations,  an 
increase of profits and competitiveness cannot be realised by the traditional short term 
solutions of labour cost reduction. An important tax reduction or reductions of the social 
security costs on the regional level is impossible due to the Belgian political system. So, 
therefore, a more innovative and creative solution is needed. In order to make up for 
these high labour costs, productivity and attractiveness for foreign investment should be 
based upon HRM, high quality and knowledge based production, R&D, education, an 
efficient administration,... These factors are also mentioned in Richard Florida’s ‘The 
rise of the creative class’ (2002). In his best-selling book, this professor on regional 
economic development links creativity to economic development.  
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The Flemish government and the Flemish social partners elaborated several measures 
and plans in order to make the labour market and labour regulation more flexible and 
the deployment of labour more attractive: the extension and financial support of day 
nursery  enabling,  the  modernisation  and  reorganisation  of  the  Flemish  employment 
office  which  must,  amongst  other  objectives,  enable  to  ‘activate’  some  difficult 
categories, such as the older and low-skilled unemployed. The introduction of what is 
called  ‘service  cheques’,  in  order  to  give  people  time  for  further  education.  The 
(regional)  state  can  provide  (or  subsidise)  all  sorts  of  education  programs  or  useful 
activities that can be part of, or support, the economic activities of that region.  
 
The switch towards some (regionally specific) kind of SWS emphasizes the importance 
of (regional) policies concerning the ‘human capital’. These and other competences, 
such as culture and education, have often been seen as soft and not that economically 
relevant. Today, their economic importance increased impressively. Since regions are 
entitled to regulate aspects that became of huge importance for the competitiveness of 
its economy, and of its immobile production factor ‘human capital’, regional authorities 
have – even in a post-fordist accumulation regime – an important, be it a changed, part 
to play in the maintenance and improvement of the welfare and well-being of their 
inhabitants in the global market. Amongst other priorities, this implies an extensive and 
flexible investment in education oriented towards the changing needs of the market and 
the promotion of life-long learning programs. Special attention in the educational policy 
is paid to the (ICT-)skills which are considered essential in the knowledge economy 
(computer sciences and informatics). These measures are additional to the promotion of 
e-commerce and internet-applications in small and medium business, the development 
of regional programmes of employee participation in profits and enterprise results (e.g. 
stock-options  for  employees),  the  support  of  (new)  growth  sectors  by  the  Regional 
Investment Agency of Flanders and the Regional Development Agencies (RDA’s) or 
the construction and growth of (e.g. speech or bio-) technology ‘valleys’, islands and 
networks of concentrated and specialised know-how, infrastructure and capital.   - 18 - 
V. Conclusion 
 
So,  politics  can  have  an  important  influence  on  the  regional  economic  policy.  The 
constitutional limits of regional policymaking forces the Flemish government to get the 
most out of existing competences that allow to pursue a post-fordist SWS. Fortunately, 
the competences available to the regional governments are utmost suited for a course 
towards some kind of SWS-version. What first looked as a limit now looks like an 
opportunity. Today, the specific existing regional competences are of strategic value for 
the adjustment to global market challenges. Additional, due to specific economical and 
political conditions, those policies are more accepted in Flanders than in the Walloon 
part, although things are changing rapidly in the southern region. For many decades, the 
dominant Socialist Party in the Walloon part was mainly concerned with large public 
employment and the preservation of the old industries instead of investments in the new 
economy, since the main part of its voters can be situated among the old labour class. 
Since  a  few  years,  the  modernised  Parti  Socialiste  under  president  Elio  Di  Rupo 
changed profoundly and tries to modernise the Walloon economy. Recently, Di Rupo 
and other Walloon and Flemish politicians and economists were engaged in a polemic 
on  which  road  to  follow  to  create  economic  growth  and  combat  unemployment  in 
Wallonia. Di Rupo incited the federal government and the socio-econonomic partners 
(included all trade unions and employers organisations) to create a ‘Marshallplan’ for 
Wallonia (De Standaard, 13 juni 2005). However, Di Rupo also states that he is well 
aware of the fact that Wallonia ought to do it itself: ‘Il faut se faire aimer’.
2  
 
In Belgium it is easy to find more arguments for further regionalisation. However, in 
this plea the challenges posed by new economy can hardly serve as deciding arguments. 
The  contemporary  regional  competences  already  make  a  Flemish  new  economy 
possible.  Furthermore,  since  there  is  an  extensive  and,  from  a  regional  perspective, 
unchangeable federal ‘minimum’ programme of social welfare provisions, the regions 
have to compete, with each other and with the rest of the European and global economy, 
on the basis of a high cost structure. 
 
                                                           
2 The same message, articulated more sharply however, is proclaimed by Alain Destexhe, member of MR, 
the Walloon liberal party. He dropped a bombshell by writing an extreme critical report on the economic   - 19 - 
The  principle  of  subsidiarity,  although  not  explicitly  present  in  the  Belgian  debate, 
claims that when in doubt decentralisation should be preferred. It is the expression of a 
political  judgment  in  the  absence  of  a  conclusive  and  clear-cut  criterion  that  could 
decide which competences should be scaled on which policy level. What is needed for 
the transition towards a new  economy  could be an alternative or at least additional 
criterion  for  the  distribution  of  competences  in  the  Belgian  federation.  The  federal 
social and fiscal system is a common framework protecting, on the basis of federal 
solidarity and loyalty, all Belgian citizens. It offers all citizens, irrespective of their 
place of residence, a protection against failure of regional policies towards the SWS. On 
the other hand, as a consequence of the high costs that result from the social security 
system, regions are forced to maximize all existing competences and to use them in a 
creative and intelligent way.  
 
So far, this has worked rather well for Flanders, one of the richest regions in the EU, but 
until now not so much in the Walloon part. This has not to do with the different set of 
competences, which are the same, but with the institutional element: a very different 
economic  situation  and  different  political  preferences.  These  preferences  do  make  a 
difference in the economic development of regions. So, politics can influence economy. 
The popular idea that, in this era of globalisation, politics has lost its grip on economy, 
is over-simplified. Even a political system that seems limiting the transformation of 
regional economies towards a kind of SWS is, when one takes a closer look, offering 
opportunities for the regional governments to pursue these policies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
situation  in  Wallonia.  He  criticizes  a.o.  the  ‘Contract  for  the  Future’  of  the  Walloon  government,  a 
blueprint for economic restructuring conceived by Di Rupo.    - 20 - 
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